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Abstract   The paper analyzes the exploitation of a local common where the be-
havior is steered by altruism rooted in social norms. The analysis is illustrated
by using the Gordon-Schäfer model of a fishery. We start by reviewing the stan-
dard results when all exploiters are purely egoists; i.e., when own utility
depends only on own profit. Under the assumption of identical harvesting effi-
ciency for all owners, we then introduce social norms and find the consequences
for the resource utilization and welfare under various degrees of altruism. It is
demonstrated that more altruism generally leads to less harvesting effort, less
economic overexploitation of the resource stock, and increased resource rent. In
a next step, we open up for differences in harvesting technology. It is shown that
a high degree of altruism, in addition to a large efficiency gap among the own-
ers, restricts the possibility of an exploitation scheme where all owners
participate in the harvesting activity. The possibility of a two-channel efficiency
improvement as a result of more altruism is also demonstrated.
Key words   Bioeconomic analysis, local commons, norms.
Introduction
Referring to the ‘conventional wisdom’ among economists about property rights,
Bromley (1989, pp.186–87) notes that, “when resource destruction is observed in
settings of joint ownership and control it is the institutional arrangements (joint re-
sponsibility) that is immediately said to be at fault.” Much in line with Ostrom
(1990) he claims that, “in practice, ‘the tragedy of the commons’ metaphor deflects
analytical attention away from the actual social arrangements able to overcome re-
source degradation and make common property regimes viable” (Bromley 1991, pp.
22–23). This flaw in the conventional economic analysis of common property re-
sources can be traced back to the use of very simplistic behavioral and institutional
assumptions where, among others, people are supposed to be individually and in-
strumentally rational, entirely self-interested, and totally unaffected by social norms
and the particular institutional arrangement in place. However, empirical and experi-
mental studies suggest that social norms and the prevailing institutional arrangement
play a crucial role for individual motivation and behavior in local resource management
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(Bardhan 1993; Ostrom and Gardner 1993; Ostrom 1990; Rabin 1998; Wade 1987).
In the following analysis, we aim to correct for this misconception. Social
norms are, therefore, assumed to influence individual behavior. Hence, common
property resource management is distinguished from that of the open access. Con-
textually, the sort of resource management settings we have in mind fall within
Ostrom’s (1990, p. 26) notion of small-scale, common-pool resources (CPRs), as for
instance ‘inshore fisheries, smaller grazing areas, groundwater basins, irrigation sys-
tems, and communal forests.’ These resources are particularly essential for people
living in the poor regions of the world (Dasgupta and Mäler 1995), and referring to
FAO-statistics, Ostrom (1990, p. 27) maintains that about 90% of the world’s fisher-
men and over half of the fish consumed each year are captured by the small-scale,
inshore fisheries. Accordingly, improper understanding and policy failures attached
to the management of these resources may have far reaching effects.
Two main features distinguish a local common property regime from open ac-
cess. Firstly, there is a specified ‘small’ number of owners that, as a group, has the
exclusive rights to appropriate the resource under consideration and, secondly, there
is an institutional structure of individual rights and duties within the group of own-
ers in which individual behavior is in compliance (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop
1975; Bromley 1991). Hence, a local common is more than an accidental collection
of independent individuals; it is a group of people in which the individual members
relate to each other according to specific conventions on cooperation and coexist-
ence, like social norms, group identity, trust, and patterns of reciprocity. These are
all part of the social and institutional capital that accumulates over time within well-
defined local commons (Baland and Platteau 1996; Ostrom 1990; Seabright 1993).
In the same way, we hold that altruism, being rooted in these conventions, and in
social norms in particular, is a result of the same historical process. Thus, by includ-
ing altruism in the analysis, we acknowledge the crucial role played by norms and
institutions in the economy of local common property management.
Social norms may trigger a variety of behavioral motivations. Our analysis is
confined to those fitting along an egoism-altruism axis, on which complete egoism
and complete altruism are the polar cases. Basically, there are two ways of address-
ing the issue of social norms analytically. Firstly, norms may be treated as ‘binding
constraints limiting the choices of a maximizing self-interested individual,’ and sec-
ondly, they may ‘play an important role in shaping individual preferences’ (Baland
and Platteau 1996, p. 116). We will adopt the latter in our treatment of altruism
rooted in social norms, and the egoism-altruism distinction will be integrated in the
preference structure of the individual agents. Based on this concept, our aim is to
explore how the level and distribution of altruism among individuals may influence
the economy of local common resource management. The various outcomes are
evaluated in terms of effort use, resource utilization, and welfare, and the reasoning
is illustrated by using the Gordon-Schäfer model of a fishery, where the solution
concept all the time is of the Nash-Cournot one-shot game type.1 We then analyze
how the introduction of altruistic preferences eliminates inefficiencies in the re-
source management of the most pessimistic of all institutional settings, the one rep-
resented by static, non-cooperative games based on strict self interests.
As a background for the analysis, we start in the next section by reviewing the
fairly standard results of the Gordon-Schäfer model when all exploiters are purely
egoists, and we have what we will refer to as ‘restricted open-access.’ In the section
that follows, we introduce social norms and analyze the resource exploitation under
1 Hence, although conventions on cooperation are indirectly accounted for through the inclusion of altruism
in the preferences of the individuals, the game theoretic concept adopted is entirely noncooperative.Local Common Exploitation 41
various degrees of altruism. In the next section, the special case when the co-owners
practice the same degree of altruism and, therefore, have the same preferences, are
analyzed. Finally, we study what happens when the exploiters use different harvest-
ing technologies and the harvesting efficiency is different.
The Standard Gordon-Schäfer Model
When the number of exploiters is explicitly considered, the basic relationships of
the Gordon-Schäfer model (see, e.g., Mesterton-Gibbons 1993) are given by:
dX dt F X hj = ( )–Σ (1)
FX r X XK () = (– ) 1 (2)
and
hq e X ii =. (3)
Equation (1) is the population dynamics of the resource (the fish stock) with X
as the stock size at time t (the time index is omitted), F(X) is the natural growth
function and hj is the harvesting of exploiter j, j = 1, ..., n and where n is fixed. The
natural growth function [equation (2)] is of the logistic type, where r is the maxi-
mum specific growth rate, and K is the carrying capacity. Finally, equation (3) yields
the Schäfer harvesting function with ei as the effort and q as the catchability coeffi-
cient. Consequently, in the present setup, all owners are assumed to have identical
catchability coefficients, thus being equally efficient in harvesting and homogeneous
in endowment (see below). This assumption is relaxed later on.
The current profit of exploiter i is now π i = (phi – cei), where p is the given mar-
ket price of the resource and c is the unit effort cost, also assumed to be given and
fixed. Combining the above equations when dX/dt = 0, gives X = K[1 – (q/r)Σ ej)].
When substituting into the harvesting function [equation (3)], we obtain hi = qK[1 –
(q/r)Σ ej]ei. The profit, or the resource rent, of exploiter i under biological equilib-
rium is, therefore, π i = pqK[1 – b – (q/r)Σ ej]ei, where b = c/Kpq. b < 1 must hold to
secure a positive profit and hence, a positive harvesting activity.
When every fisherman maximizes profit under biological equilibrium and treats
the effort of all the (n – 1) other exploiters as given so that the solution concept is of
the Nash-Cournot type, we obtain the open-access solution under the assumption of
a fixed number of exploiters. The equilibrium effort of owner i is then given as:
er b q n i
roa = (–)(+) 11 . (4)
Equation (4) represents the restricted open-access effort (denoted by superscript
‘roa’), emphasizing that the property relations between the exploiters are the same
as in the traditional notion of open access, except from the constraint imposed on
the number of agents. The total effort of the n fishermen follows as Eroa = nr(1 – b)/
q(n + 1). Substituted into the profit function, the profit of exploiter i reads  π i
roa =
Kpr(1 – b)2/(n + 1)2, while the total profit is π roa = Kprn(1 – b)2/(n + 1)2. Hence, con-
trary to the traditional concept of open access, there will always be a positive economic
rent in the restricted open access case; i.e., the rent will never be entirely dissipated.
The equilibrium stock will be Xroa = K(1 + nb)/(n + 1). For more details, see below.Skonhoft and Solstad 42
The restricted open-access solution can be compared to the Pareto efficient so-
lution when the total resource rent π  = Σπ j is maximized so that the stock externali-
ties are internalized. The effort use of exploiter i is then given by:
erb q n i
s =(–) 12 (5)
(superscript ‘s’ denotes overall optimality). The total effort follows as Es = r(1 – b)/
2q, which is independent of n because the harvesting function is linear in the effort
use. Moreover, we find that the total resource rent reads π s = Kpr(1 – b)2/4, and the
equilibrium stock is Xs = K(1 + b)/2. Es is below Eroa for all n > 1, while Xs is above
Xroa, and the discrepancy increases when n shifts up because of more stock externali-
ties. All these results are well known (see Mesterton-Gibbons 1993).
Exploitation Under Various Degree of Altruism
The above solution was obtained when the behavior of every exploiter was steered
by strict egoism; own utility depends only on own profit. This is the restricted open-
access solution because there are no social norms governing the individual exploita-
tion of the resource. However, as discussed in the introduction, a local common
property regime is characterized by having a structure of individual rights and duties
within the group of owners in which the individual members relate to each other ac-
cording to specific conventions on cooperation. These social norms are now embed-
ded in the model by changing the assumption of purely egoistic behavior with altru-
istic behavior.2
The various degree of altruism will be reflected by the weight put on the well
being of the others relative to own well being. The utility of owner i is, therefore,
now a weighted sum of own profit and the profit of the other exploiters. We use the
specific functional form Ui = (1 – µ i)π i + [µ i/(n – 1)]Σπ j, where i = 1, ..., n and j = 1,
..., i – 1, i + 1, …, n. The (exogenous) weight µ i is assumed to be in the domain [0,
(n – 1)/n] and a higher µ i means more altruism. If the weight is equal to (n – 1)/n,
we define owner i to be completely altruistic, and hence, Ui = (1/n)Σπ j, where i = 1,
…, n and j = 1, …, n. On the contrary, the model coincides with the standard Gor-
don-Schäfer model when µ i = 0; i.e., when there is pure egoism and the preferences
are given by Ui = π i.3
To obtain analytical results, we consider only two exploiters. The utility func-
tions are then:
U11 1 1 2 1 =( – ) + µπ µ π (6)
and
U22 2 2 1 1 =( – ) + . µπ µ π (7)
For owner 1, the utility writes U1 = pqK[1 – b – (q/r)(e1 + e2)][(1 – µ 1)e1 + µ 1e2]
when using equations (1)–(3), and U2 = pqK[1 – b – (q/r)(e2 + e1)][(1 – µ 2)e2 + µ 2e1] for
2 Becker (1976; 1981) and Kurz (1978), among others, discuss the underlying individual motives to act
altruistically in other contexts (e.g., within the family).
3 The possibility of ‘overaltruism’; i.e., the case when µ i is in the domain (n – 1/n,1] is therefore ruled
out. Neither the case of masochism nor envy are considered (Stark 1995).Local Common Exploitation 43
owner 2. It can easily be confirmed that the utility functions are strictly concave in
own effort under the given restrictions on µ i. Under the assumption of utility maxi-
mization, ∂ Ui/∂ ei = 0 (i = 1,2), we obtain the best response functions as:
21 1 1 11 2 1 (– ) + =(– ) (–) µµ ee r b q (8)
and
ee rb q 12 2 2 21 1 1 + ( –)= ( –) ( – ) µµ (9)
where equation (8) is for owner 1 and equation (9) is for owner 2. See figure 1.
Solving, the Nash equilibrium comes out as:
erb q 11 2 1 2 11 2 1 4 1 1 1 * =(–) (– ) (– ) [ (– ) (– ) –] µµ µµ (10)
and
erb q 22 1 1 2 11 2 1 4 1 1 1 * = ( – ) ( – ) ( –) [ ( –) ( –) – ] µµ µµ (11)
Superscript ‘*’ denotes the general case of altruism. The equilibrium will be unique
except when both owners are completely altruistic and µ 1 = µ 2 = 0.5. The best re-
sponse functions will then coincide and it will be an infinite number of equilibria. It
is also seen that the problem has no interior solution when one of the owners is com-
pletely altruistic. Hence, when µ 1 = 0.5 (µ 2 = 0.5) and µ 2 (µ 1) is in the domain [0,
0.5), the best response functions will intersect at the e2-axis (e1-axis) so the effort of
owner 1 (2) is zero, e1
* = 0 (e2
* = 0). However, when µ i is in the domain [0, 0.5) and
the problem has an unique interior solution, it can easily be confirmed that ∂∂ e11
* µ
Figure 1. The Best Response Functions Under Various Degree of AltruismSkonhoft and Solstad 44
< 0 and ∂∂ e21
* µ  > 0, and ∂∂ e22
* µ  < 0 and ∂∂ e12
* µ  > 0 hold (see figure 1). In-
creased altruism works, as expected, in the direction of less own effort and more ef-
fort of the other owner. Combining the equilibrium conditions, it is also seen that
ee 12
**  = (1 – 2µ 1)(1 – µ 2)/(1 – 2µ 2)(1 – µ 1) holds; i.e., the relative harvesting effort is
only contingent upon the various degree of altruism.
Having characterized the equilibrium, we proceed to show how altruism influ-
ences the exploitation of the local common resource. From equations (10) and (11) it
follows directly that the total effort will be E* = r(1 – b)[(1 – 2µ 1)(1 – µ 2) + (1 –
2µ 2)(1 – µ 1)]/[4(1 – µ 1)(1 – µ 2) – 1]q, and E* will be reduced when altruism in-
creases, ∂ E*/∂µ i < 0 (i = 1,2). Less effort of one owner must, therefore, outweigh
more effort of the other. Moreover, when there is some degree of altruism among at least
one of the exploiters, E* < Eroa must hold. Because the stock size of the resource is de-
creasing in the total effort use, X* = K(1 – qE*/r), we will also have that ∂ X*/∂µ i > 0
(i = 1,2). A strengthening of social norms, leading to increased altruism, works un-
ambiguously in the direction of less effort and less overexploitation of the resource.
The next question is, what happens to the resource rent when there is a move-
ment in the direction of more altruism? The profit of owner 1 will be π 1
* = pqK[1 –
b – (q/r)E*]e1
*, which after some rearrangements can be written as π 1
* = Kpr(1 –
b)2(1 – µ 1 – µ 2)(1 – 2µ 1)(1 – µ 2)/[4(1 – µ 1)(1 – µ 2) – 1]2. It can be confirmed that
∂∂< πµ 110 *  will hold. Finding the corresponding equilibrium profit of owner 2
and differentiating, we obtain ∂∂ πµ 21
* >0 .  The total profit is π * = Kpr(1 – b)2(1 –
µ 1 – µ 2)[(1 – 2µ 1)(1 – µ 2) + (1 – 2µ 2)(1 – µ 1)/[4(1 – µ 1)(1 – µ 2) – 1]2 and hence,
∂∂ πµ *
i >0 .  The total profit increases when one of the owners becomes more al-
truistic. The conclusion is that when individuals become more altruistic oriented,
own effort and own profit will be reduced. At the same time, this ensures that total
effort decreases and overall profit increases.
The above results were obtained when it was an interior solution for effort use.
When owner 1 is purely altruistic and, therefore, indifferent to whether the resource
rent is obtained through own harvesting activity or the activity of others, µ 1 = 0.5,
while µ 2 is in the domain [0, 0.5). Equations (10) and (11) reduce to e1
* = 0 and e2
* =
r(1 – b)/2q, respectively. In this case, the harvesting activity of owner 2 is indepen-
dent of the degree of own altruism, and the effort use coincides with the total effort
under overall optimality; i.e.,  e2
* = Es. This result is obvious; when harvesting takes
place by only one agent there will be no stock externalities.4 We will also have π 1
* =
0 and π 2
* = π * = π s, and the complete altruist renounces his personal profit. Hence,
being indifferent about who obtains the profit, the complete altruist will keep away
from own harvesting because the stock externalities are neutralized, and the total re-
source rent is maximized.
A Special Case: The Same Preferences of the Owners
We now look at the special case when the degree of altruism rooted in social norms
is the same among the owners so that µ 1 = µ 2 = µ  holds. The solution is then sym-
metric and the equilibrium effort will be:
erb q i i
* =(–) (–) (– ) (–)– 111 2 4 1 1 1 2 2 µµ µ [] = ;, (12)
4 This is, however, not a general result. When there are three or more owners and just one is completely
altruist, harvesting will take place by the other two. Stock externalities will, therefore, be present, and
the total effort use will be above that of the overall optimum.Local Common Exploitation 45
As above, the solution will obviously be as in the standard Gordon-Schäfer
model when µ  = 0; ee ii
roa * =  and E* = Eroa. It also follows that ∂∂ ei
* µ <0 ;  i.e., the
effort of each owner decreases when there is a general movement in the direction of
more altruism. Moreover, by using L’Hopitals rule, it can be demonstrated that ei
*
approaches  ei
s(i = 1,2), and hence, E* approaches Es, when µ  approaches 0.5. When
we are close to the strict altruistic case, each owner uses approximately the same ef-
fort as under overall optimality. See figure 2.
The equilibrium stock size can now be written as X* = K{1 – 2(1 – b)(1 – µ )(1 –
2µ )/[4(1 – µ )2 – 1]}, while the total profit is π * = 2Kpr(1 – b)2(1 – µ )(1 – 2µ )2/[4(1 – µ )2
– 1]2. Hence, more altruism means less ecological and economic overexploitation. In
the limiting case when µ  approaches 0.5, the stock size will also approach the stock
size under overall optimality. This will also be so for profit. Being altruists, the
owners maximize total resource rent and thus internalize the stock externalities; they
reduce harvesting effort to avoid imposing high unit harvesting costs on their co-
owners.
Differences in Efficiency
We now study what happens when there are differences in harvesting efficiency
among the owners. According to Baland and Platteau (1996), the focus is then di-
rected to the twin issues of group size and homogeneity. The conventional argument
is that social norms are more likely to appear in homogeneous groups of small num-
bers. Moreover, it is supposed that homogeneity is more likely to be present in small
groups, indicating that the effect of group size partly works through the homogene-
ity factor. Baland and Platteau (1996, p. 301), however, argue that, “too often, het-
erogeneity is blamed as a matter of principle without enough effort being devoted to
spelling out the precise conditions under which it undermines collective action.” To
correct for this misconception, they separate between three main sources of hetero-
Figure 2. Overall Effort Use Under the Same Degree of AltruismSkonhoft and Solstad 46
geneity; those of culture, interests, and endowments. From their empirical studies,
they conclude that heterogeneity of endowments, quite contrary to those of culture
and interests, may enhance co-operation and stimulate collective action. As skills
are included in their endowments category, our notion of differences in efficiency
falls within this category.
Hence, to analyze the above issues within the present setting, the assumption
that technical skills or the efficiency in harvesting are identical, is relaxed. We still
consider only two owners and restrict the analysis to the situation where the agents
have the same weights in their utility functions, µ 1 = µ 2 = µ . The utility functions
under biological equilibrium when the catchability coefficient q varies are then U1 =
(1 – µ )pq1K[1 – b1 – (1/r)(q1e1 + q2e2)]e1 + µ pq2K[1 – b2 – (1/r)(q1e1 + q2e2)]e2 for
owner 1, U2 = (1 – µ )pq2K[1 – b2 – (1/r)(q1e1 + q2e2)]e2 + µ pq1K[1 – b1 – (1/r)(q1e1 +
q2e2)]e1 for owner 2, and where bi = c/pqiK < 1 (i = 1,2). Under the assumption of
utility maximization and an interior solution, ∂ Ui/∂ ei = 0 (i = 1,2), the Nash-equilib-
rium will now be given by:
er b b q 11 2
2
1 12 11 1 4 1 1 * =(– )(– ) (– ) – (– ) (– )– µµ µ [] [](13)
and
er b b q 22 1
2
2 12 11 1 4 1 1 * =(– )(– ) (– ) – (– ) (– )– . µµ µ [] [] (14)
To obtain an interior solution with positive harvesting efforts, more restrictions
on the ecological and economic parameters have to be imposed. e1 0 * >  will hold
when (1 – b2)/(1 – b1) < 2(1 – µ ), while e2 0 * >  holds when (1 – b2)/(1 – b1) > 1/2(1
– µ ). The feasible set for an interior solution is, therefore, determined by the relative
efficiency together with the degree of altruism, and is represented by the shaded
area in figure 3. The feasible set shrinks when the degree of altruism increases.
Hence, a ‘high’ degree of altruism accompanied by a ‘small’ efficiency gap means
that one of the owners will refrain from harvesting because of stock externalities,
while the other one takes the total catch; say, e1 0 * =  and e2
* = r(1 – b2)/2q2 = Es. The
same happens under a modest degree of altruism accompanied by a large efficiency
gap.5
The result that a large efficiency gap causes the most efficient (or the most effi-
cient ones in a general setting with more agents) to take all the catch is earlier dem-
onstrated by, among others, Mesterton-Gibbons (1993). What is new here, is that a
similar outcome is generated under the assumption of a small efficiency gap if com-
bined with a high degree of altruism. Altruism rooted in social norms adds a new
channel to a more efficient exploitation of the common as it reallocates harvesting
effort from the least efficient to the most efficient by making the least efficient
owner stop fishing altogether, thus leaving only one owner left in the fishery. Hence,
total rent of the fishery is increased, firstly, due to the elimination of stock externali-
ties as only one owner will be left in the fishery and, secondly, due to the fact that
5 The present notion of relative efficiency should, however, be interpreted with care because the vertical
axis on figure 3 refers to the ratio (1 – b2)/(1 – b1), and not q2/q1. The simplest way to illustrate this
point is when altruism is absent. When µ  = 0,  e1 0 * >  if (1 – 2a) + a/q2 > 0, and  e2 0 * >  if q2 > 2a(1 + a).
bi is here replaced, and we have a = biqi = c/pK. In addition, the catchability coefficient of owner two is
normalized to one, q1 = 1. Accordingly, we must have a < 1. Depending on the value of a, which can be
interpreted as the cost-price ratio, it can be easily shown that the conditions for obtaining an interior
solution are fulfilled for a wide range of values of q2. Hence, when µ  = 0, an interior solution can take place
for small as well as large gaps in efficiency among the harvesters. This is also the case when µ  > 0.Local Common Exploitation 47
the one remaining will be the most efficient. Notice also that altruism triggers a vol-
untary withdrawal from harvesting, compared to a coerced withdrawal in the con-
ventional model; that is, withdrawal and reduction in the number of exploiters take
place because individual preferences are more in accordance with the interests of the
collective. The co-owners of the local common can then reap the fruit of labour divi-
sion, where the most efficient fishermen harvest, while the least efficient find alter-
native work at the prevailing opportunity cost, c. Our theoretical reasoning on het-
erogeneity fostering cooperation is, therefore, in line with the above mentioned em-
pirical findings of Baland and Platteau (1996).
When there are interior solutions and both owners harvest, a changing degree of
altruism yields:
∂∂ [] {} [] er b b q 11 2
2 2
1 41 1 5 4 2 1 41 1 * µµ µ µ µ = ( –) ( – ) – – (–) ( – ) ( –)– (15)
and
∂∂ [] {} [] er b b q 22 1
2 2
2 41 1 5 4 2 1 41 1 * µµ µ µ µ = ( –) ( – ) – – (–) ( – ) ( –)– (16)
We have the suspected result ∂∂ e1 0 * < µ  when (1 – b2)/(1 – b1) > (1 – µ )/[5/4 – µ (2
– µ )], and ∂∂ e2 0 * < µ   when (1 – b2)/(1 – b1) < [5/4 – µ (2 – µ )]/(1 – µ ). This case is
given in the middle of the shaded area in figure 3. Hence, as long as there is a small
Figure 3. The Feasible Set for an interior Solution Under
Different Degree of Altruism and Efficiency.
Note: Both owners harvest (the shaded area) and only one harvest (the non-shaded area). Outside
the box, the least efficient is forced to leave harvesting regardless of the prevalence of altruism.Skonhoft and Solstad 48
initial degree of altruism and a small efficiency gap, we obtain the same result as in
the previous section. On the other hand, if there is a large initial degree of altruism
or a large efficiency gap, we obtain other results and only the least efficient owner
will reduce harvesting, while the most efficient, in fact, will increase harvesting ef-
fort. These cases take place in the upper part of the shaded area when owner 2 is
most efficient, ∂∂ e2 0 * > µ  and ∂∂ e1 0 * <, µ  and in the lower part when 1 is the
most efficient harvester, ∂∂ e1 0 * > µ  and ∂∂ e2 0 * <. µ
A general movement in the direction toward more altruistic behavior when the
efficiency gap is large (but small enough to secure an interior solution) so that the
harvesting activity of the most efficient increases, while the activity of the other
shrinks, leads to a major reallocation of effort use. However, for the outcomes tak-
ing place in the upper and lower parts of the shaded area, we demonstrate that total
effort will decrease, ensuring a reduction of the economic overexploitation of the re-
source stock and an increase in the total resource rent, ∂ E*/∂µ  < 0, ∂ X*/∂µ  > 0 and
∂π */∂µ  > 0.6 More altruism promotes more efficient exploitation through a neutral-
ization of the stock externalities. However, under these regimes an additional chan-
nel for efficiency improvement is present as the harvesting activity of the most effi-
cient expands, while the activity of the least efficient shrinks. Efficiency improve-
ment is achieved through redistribution of the harvesting shares as well.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have studied the exploitation of a local common natural resource
with a structure of individual rights and duties within the group of co-owners in
which individual behavior is in compliance. Sharply in contrast to conventional eco-
nomic analysis, the study is based on the assumption that the behavior of each
owner is steered by altruism rooted in social norms. By introducing altruistic prefer-
ences, the role played by social and institutional capital are acknowledged. We have
also used the term ‘restricted open access,’ pertaining to the traditional notion of
open access, except with the assumption of a limited number of agents.
The analysis has been illustrated by using the Gordon-Schäfer model of a fish-
ery, and where the exploitation takes place through a one-shot game with an equilib-
rium concept of the Nash-type. The main results can be summarized as follows.
More altruism leads to less harvesting effort, less economic overexploitation of the
resource, and a higher rent. In the limiting case when all owners are completely al-
truistic, the exploitation of the common takes place as under overall optimality; i.e.,
as in a situation where the stock externalities are internalized. The present one-shot
game model with altruistic behavior produces qualitatively the same results as the
Nash equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and where
individual utility is based strictly on self interests; i.e., own utility depends only on
own profit (the so-called Folk-theorem, see Gibbons 1992). More importantly, we
have demonstrated that when there are differences in harvesting efficiency among
the exploiters, altruism combined with efficiency gaps restricts the possibility of ob-
taining an exploitation scheme where all owners participate in the harvesting activ-
ity. Altruism in combination with efficiency gaps adds a new channel for efficiency
improvement as it reallocates effort from the less efficient to the more efficient har-
vesters. In the boundary solution where exploiters voluntarily withdraw from exploi-
tation due to altruistic preferences, our analysis also concludes that heterogeneity,
6 We have not been able to show these results analytically. They are confirmed by numerical experi-
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indeed, may stimulate collective action. This conclusion challenges the conventional
belief that group homogeneity is unambiguously positive for common property man-
agement, and it applies to the case of heterogeneity in technological skills.
As long as the owners are not completely altruistic, the model presented in the
paper joins conventional theory in concluding that economic inefficiencies are less
severe when the group of owners is small. More importantly, however, the model in-
dicates that the presence of social and institutional capital may be more crucial for
the well functioning of common property regimes than the size of the group. In fact,
it is shown that the adverse effects of large numbers may be partly or completely
neutralized by social norms either through a coordinated internalization of stock ex-
ternalities or through a voluntary withdrawal from harvesting in the case of hetero-
geneity in efficiency and skills.
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